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Abstract
I investigate a dynamic oligopoly game where firms enter simultaneously
but compete hierarchically a` la Stackelberg at each instant over time. They
accumulate capacity through costly investment, with capital acumulation
dynamics being aﬀected by an additive shock the mean and variance of which
are known. The main findings are the following. First, the Stackelberg
game is uncontrollable by the leader; hence, it is time consistent. Second,
the leaders invest more than the followers; as a result, in steady state, the
leaders’ capacity and profits are larger than the followers’. Therefore, the
present analysis does not confirm Gibrat’s Law, since the individual growth
rate is determined by the timing of moves.
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1 Introduction
Firms’ entry and growth in an industry have attracted a great deal of atten-
tion within both industrial and applied economics for several decades. Ever
since Gibrat’s seminal contribution (Gibrat, 1931), the established wisdom
has maintained that expected firm growth rates are independent of firm size,
a property known as Gibrat’s Law. Both theoretical and empirical research
have been extensively carried out along this line.1 So far, the existing lit-
erature provides heterogeneous answers to the question as the way we shall
expect market dynamics to unravel, given some degree of initial asymmetry
among firms.
Two relevant contributions by Lucas and Prescott (1971) and Lucas
(1978) investigate entry and exit decisions in long-run competitive equilib-
rium models where prices, outputs and investments are driven by stochastic
processes. In a pioneering paper, Jovanovic (1982) proposes a theory of noisy
selection where firms enter over time and learn about their productive eﬃ-
ciency as they operate in the market. Those that are relatively more eﬃcient
grow and survive, while those who relatively less eﬃcient decline and ulti-
mately exit the industry. Hopenhayn (1992) analyzes the case of individual
productivity shocks and their eﬀects on entry, exit and market dynamics in
the long-run. He finds that the steady state equilibrium implies a size dis-
tribution of firms by age cohorts, and proves that the size distribution is
stochastically increasing in the age of the cohorts. Jovanovic’s model is ex-
tended by Ericson and Pakes (1995) who consider two models of firm behav-
ior, allowing for heterogeneity among firms, idiosyncratic (or firm-specific)
1For early empirical studies confirming Gibrat’s law, see Hart and Prais (1956), Simon
and Bonini (1958) and Hymer and Pashigian (1962). An exhaustive overview of empirical
findings is in Audretsch, Santarelli and Vivarelli (1999). For a thorough appraisal of
Gibrat’s contribution, see Sutton (1997).
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sources of uncertainty, and discrete outcomes (exit and/or entry).2
Broadly speaking, an overview of this literature leads one to think that
‘older firms are bigger than younger firms’. An important question to this
regard is the following: is moving first a prerequisite (i.e., a necessary condi-
tion) for a firm to become larger than its rivals, or is it a suﬃcient condition?
Here I propose a dynamic oligopoly model under uncertainty generalising
some of the aspects treated in Lambertini (2005). Firms enter simultaneously
and then compete hierarchically a` la Stackelberg, at each instant over an
infinite horizon. They accumulate capacity through costly investment, as
in Solow’s (1956) and Swan’s (1956) growth model. At every instant, first
the investment levels are chosen, then shocks realize and finally productive
capacities are determined as a function of the shocks. Due to the formal
properties of the model, the game possesses a unique and time consistent
open-loop equilibrium.
The main results are as follows. The relative performance of firms de-
pends on several factors, including the relative size of shocks as well as the
relative number of leaders and followers. In particular, if investment costs
are negligible, or the variance of the shock aﬀecting the leaders is low, or
again firms are subject to a common shock, then the expected profits of the
representative leader exceed those of the representative follower. These re-
sults tend to confirm the acquired wisdom according to which leading entails
a ‘first mover advantage’, when choice variables directly pertain to the size
of the firm, as it also happens in static Cournot games (see Dowrick, 1986;
Hamilton and Slutsky, 1990, inter alia). More interestingly, the opposite re-
sult is also admissible, namely, that the followers may ultimately overtake
the leaders in the steady state (this can happen, for instance, when shocks
2In a subsequent paper, Pakes and Ericson (1998) evaluate the empirical implications
of Jovanovic’s model and their model of industry dynamics.
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are idiosyncratic, or when the variance of the shock aﬀecting the leader is
suﬃciently large).
The model investigated in the present paper allows me to propose a few
considerations as to the debate concerning the intertemporal growth of firms.
First, the Stackelberg model described here shows that an industry equilib-
rium that is characterized by an uneven size distribution of firms may not
necessarily be the outcome of the entry process, but may be rather the con-
sequence of (i) a strategic advantage of some firms over the others, or (ii)
an asymmetric distribution of shocks across firms that are otherwise fully
symmetric and have played simultaneously along the entire history of the
industry. Second, whether leaders grows more or less than followers is in-
dependent of initial conditions, which may or may not diﬀer across firms.
Consequently, in general, the present analysis does not confirm Gibrat’s Law,
since sequential play induces an asymmetry in growth rates for any admis-
sible distribution of initial capacities across firms. Likewise, the indications
provided by the Nash game are in contrast with Gibrat’s law, as the expected
equilibrium size and performance of firms are symmetric irrespective of initial
conditions, so that any asymmetric vector of initial capacities involves asym-
metric growth rates in order to reach a symmetric steady state allocation (in
expected value).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents
the general features of the model. The open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium
is derived in section 3, while section 4 contains some comparative statics.
Concluding remarks are in section 4.
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2 The setup
N firms operate over continuous time t ∈ [0,∞) in a market for diﬀerentiated
goods, the demand function for variety v at any t being:
pv(t) = a− qv(t)− s
X
z 6=v
qz(t) , (1)
where s ∈ [0, 1] is the constant degree of substitutability between any two
varieties. If s = 0 then each firm is a monopolist in a separate market, while
on the contrary if s = 1 then firms supply homogeneous goods.
The game unravels following a sequential play framework. Out of the
population of N firms, f ≡ {1, 2, 3, ...F} of them are followers while l ≡
{F + 1, F + 2, F + 3, ...N} of them are leaders, with F ≥ 1 and N ≥ F + 1.
Each firm keeps playing the same role over the whole horizon of the game.
In order to supply the final good, firms must build up capacity (i.e.,
physical capital) kv(t) through intertemporal investment:
dkv(t)
dt ≡
·
kv = Iv(t)− δkv(t) + εv (t) , v = 1, 2, 3, ...F, F + 1, ...N, (2)
where δ ∈ [0, 1] is the depreciation rate, constant and equal across firms; εv (t)
is the shock aﬀecting firm v, and it is assumed to be i.i.d. across periods.
Furthermore, for the sake of simplicity I will assume throughout the paper
that
εv (t) = εF (t) ∀v = 1, 2, 3, ...F
εv (t) = εL (t) ∀v = F + 1, F + 2, F + 3, ...N
(3)
E (εi) = 0; E
¡
ε2i
¢
= σ2i , i = F,L (4)
and E (εFεL) = E (εLεF ) = σ2FL .
At any instant t, the sequence of events is taken to be as follows:
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• firms sequentially choose investment eﬀorts Iv (t) , then
• shocks realize, and finally
• the interaction between investments, depreciation and the firm-specific
shock determines capacity through (2) and the dynamics of control,
dIv(t)/dt, for each firm.3
For the sake of simplicity, in the remainder I assume that qv(t) = kv(t),
i.e., all firms operate at full capacity at any instant. At any t, firm v bears
the following total costs:
Cv(t) = b [Iv(t)]2 , b ≥ 0, (5)
where marginal production cost is constant and normalised to zero in order
to shrink to a minimum the set of parameters. The instantaneous profit of
firm v is:
πv(t) = p(t)− b [Iv(t)]2 . (6)
For each firm v, the instantaneous investment eﬀort Iv(t) is the control
variable, while capacity kv(t) is the state variable. The value of the state
variables at t = 0 is given by the vector k(0) = k0 . The aim of firm v
consists in:
max
Iv(t)
Jv ≡
Z ∞
0
πv(t)e−ρtdt (7)
subject to the relevant dynamic constraints. The factor e−ρt discounts future
gains, and the discount rate ρ > 0 is assumed to be constant and common
to all players. In order to solve the optimization problem, each firm defines
3The deterministic version of the present model has been investigated, under simulta-
neous play only, in the previous literature (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1983; Fershtman and
Muller, 1984; Reynolds, 1987) and can be ultimately traced back to Solow (1956) and
Swan (1956).
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a strategy Iv(t) at each t, for any admissible Ij(t), j 6= v. If, when choosing
Iv(t), firm v explicitly takes into account the stock of state variables k (t)
at time t (or their evolution up to that time), the game is solved in closed-
loop strategies. Otherwise, if controls are chosen only upon calendar time,
the game is solved in open-loop strategies. On the one hand, a closed-loop
solution is clearly preferable in that it accounts for feedback eﬀects at all
times during the game; however, on the other hand, it is worth stressing that
the choice of the solution concept may be taken depending upon the nature
of the problem at hand. Indeed, the main diﬀerence between open-loop and
closed-loop approaches is that in the former, players decide by looking at the
clock (i.e., calendar time), while in the latter, they decide by looking at the
stock (i.e., the past history of the game). Whether the second perspective is
more realistic than the first has to be evaluated within the specific framework
being used, in relation with the kind of story the model itself tries to account
for (Clemhout and Wan, 1994, p. 812). If controls describe something like
investment plans, these can in fact be sticky enough to justify the adoption
of an open-loop solution. The next question is whether open-loop rules can
produce subgame perfect equilibria or not. Briefly, an equilibrium is (at least
weakly) time consistent if, at any intermediate time τ ∈ [0,∞) , no player
has an incentive to deviate from the plan initially designed at time zero (at
least in view of the stocks of state variables at time τ).4
3 The game
The Stackelberg game is taken to be solved by firms in open-loop strategies.
Consider first the optimum problem for the followers, i.e., firms belonging to
4A more detailed illustration of these issues can be found in Dockner et al. (2000,
section 4.3, pp. 98-107; and ch. 5).
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the set f ≡ {1, 2, 3, ...F} . Given that all of them are a priori symmetric and
face the same problem, I will confine my attention to a single representative
follower, say, firm F. Its expected value Hamiltonian is:
E [HF (k (t) , I (t))] = E
("
a− kF (t)− s
ÃF−1X
i=1
ki(t) +
NX
j=F+1
ki(t)
!#
kF (t)+
−b [IF (t)]2 + µFF (t) [IF (t)− δkF (t) + εF (t)] +
+
F−1X
i=1
µFi(t) [Ii(t)− δki(t) + εF (t)] +
+
NX
j=F+1
µFj(t) [Ij(t)− δkj(t) + εL (t)]
)
, (8)
where µFj(t) is the co-state variable associated with state variable kj(t). The
first order conditions are (exponential discounting is omitted for brevity):
∂E [HF (k (t) , I (t))]
∂IF (t)
= −2bIF (t) + µFF (t) = 0 ; (9)
−∂ [HF (k (t) , I (t))]∂kF (t) =
∂µFF (t)
∂t ⇒ (10)
∂µFF (t)
∂t = µFF (t)δ − a+ s
ÃF−1X
i=1
ki(t) +
NX
j=F+1
kj(t)
!
+ 2kF (t) ; (11)
−∂ [HF (k (t) , I (t))]∂kh(t) =
∂µFh(t)
∂t ⇒
∂µFh(t)
∂t = µFh(t)δ + skh(t), ∀h 6= F.
(12)
Equations (9-12) must be considered together with the initial conditions
k(0) = k0 and the transversality condition:
lim
t→∞
µFv(t) · kv(t) = 0 , v = F + 1, F + 2, F + 3, ...N. (13)
From (9), one obtains:
µFF (t) = 2bIF (t) ;
∂IF (t)
∂t =
1
2b
∂µFF (t)
∂t . (14)
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Moreover, from co-state equations(11-12), one can check that the expressions
of co-state variables:
µFF (t) =
Z ∂µFF (t)
∂t ; µFh(t) =
Z ∂µFh(t)
∂t , ∀h 6= F (15)
are independent of any rivals’ controls, in particular the followers’ controls.
This fact proves the following result (see Xie, 1997):5
Lemma 1 The Stackelberg game is uncontrollable by the leaders. Therefore,
the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium is time consistent.
Before approaching the leader’s problem, it is worth observing, again
from (14), that the evolution of firm F ’s investment does not depend on
any µFh(t). This redundancy of the dynamics of the other firms’ co-state
variables as to the follower’s decisions is going to become useful in order to
characterise the equilibrium.
Now I can characterize the leader’s problem. As with the follower, again
in view of the ex ante symmetry characterising the population of leaders, I
may focus upon a single firm that will be taken as a representative leader,
say, firm N. Its Hamiltonian function (in expected value) is:
E [HN(k (t) , IN (t)] = E
("
a− kN(t)− s
Ã FX
i=1
ki(t) +
N−1X
j=F+1
kj(t)
!#
kN(t)+
−b [IN(t)]2 + µNN(t) [IN(t)− δkN(t) + εL (t)] +
+
N−1X
j=F+1
µNj(t) [Ij(t)− δkj(t) + εL (t)] +
+
FX
i=1
µNi(t)
·
µii(t)
2b − δki(t) + εF (t)
¸
+
5See also Dockner et al. (2000, ch. 5) and Cellini et al. (2005).
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+
FX
i=1
θNi(t)
·
∂µii(t)
∂t
¸
+
FX
i=1
N−1X
j=1
φNj(t)
·∂µij(t)
∂t
¸)
(16)
where θNi(t) and φNj(t) are the additional co-state variables attached by the
leader to the followers’ co-state equations, and the expressions ∂µii(t)/∂t and
∂µij(t)/∂t are given by (11-12). Solving the leader’s problem, one obtains
(superscripts l and f stand for leader and follower, respectively):
Lemma 2 At the steady state of the Stackelberg open-loop game, optimal
capacities are:
kl =
2
¡
1 + bδ2
¢
(a+ 2bδεL)− s [a+ 2bδ (εL + F (εF − εL))]
4
¡
1 + bδ2
¢2
+ 2s
¡
1 + bδ2
¢
(N − 2)− s2 (N + F − 1)
,
kf =
4
¡
1 + bδ2
¢2
(a+ 2bδεF ) + 2s
¡
1 + bδ2
¢
Γ− s2Ψ
8
¡
1 + gδ2
¢3
+ 4s
¡
1 + bδ2
¢2
(N + F − 3) + s2Ω− s3Λ
,
Γ ≡ a (F − 2) + 2bδ [εF (N − 2)− εL (N − F )] ;
Ψ ≡ a (2F − 1) + 2bδ [εF (N + F − 1− F (N − F ))− εL (N − F ) (F − 1)] ;
Ω ≡ 2
¡
1 + bδ2
¢
[3− 2 (N − F ) + F (N − 5)] ;
Λ ≡ (F − 1) (N + F − 1) .
Proof. The first order conditions for the representative leader are:
∂E [HN(·)]
∂IN(t)
= −2bIN(t) + µNN(t) = 0 ; (17)
−∂E [HN(·)]∂kN(t) =
∂µNN(t)
∂t ⇒ (18)
∂µNN(t)
∂t = µNN(t)δ−a+2kN(t)+s
Ã FX
i=1
ki(t) +
N−1X
j=F+1
kj(t)
!
−s
FX
i=1
θNi(t) ;
(19)
−∂E [HN(·)]∂kj(t) =
∂µNj(t)
∂t ⇒ (20)
∂µNj(t)
∂t = µNj(t)δ + skN(t)− s
FX
i=1
θNi(t); (21)
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−∂E [HN(·)]∂ki(t) =
∂µNi(t)
∂t ⇒ (22)
∂µNi(t)
∂t = µNi(t)δ + skN(t)− 2θNi(t)− s
ÃX
h6=i
θNh(t) +
N−1X
j=1
φNj(t)
!
; (23)
−∂E [HN(·)]∂µih(t)
=
∂φNh(t)
∂t ⇒
∂φNh(t)
∂t = −δφNh(t) ; (24)
−∂E [H1(·)]∂µii(t)
=
∂θNi (t)
∂t ⇒
∂θNi(t)
∂t = −
µNi(t)
2b − δθLi(t) . (25)
The above conditions are accompanied by the initial conditions k(0) = k0 as
well as the transversality condition:
lim
t→∞
µNj(t) · kj(t) = 0 (26)
lim
t→∞
θNi(t) · µNi(t) = 0
lim
t→∞
φNh(t) · µNh(t) = 0
for all i, j, h.
From (17) one immediately gets:
µNN(t) = b+ 2bIN(t) ;
∂IN(t)
∂t =
1
2b
∂µNN(t)
∂t ⇒ (27)
∂IN(t)
∂t =
1
2g
"
µNN(t)δ − a+ 2kN(t) + s
Ã FX
i=1
ki(t) +
N−1X
j=F+1
kj(t)
!
−
FX
i=1
θNi(t)
#
.
(28)
Additionally, from (24), we observe that
∂φNh
∂t = 0 if and only if φNh = 0.
Proceeding likewise, note that from (25), we have:
∂θNi(t)
∂t = 0⇔ θNi(t) = −
µNi(t)
2bδ . (29)
Now, having taken all the relevant first order conditions, I may impose sym-
metry across (i) leaders and (ii) follower, by setting
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• ki (t) = kF (t) for all i, kj (t) = kN (t) for all j;
• Ii (t) = IF (t) for all i, Ij (t) = IN (t) for all j.
Accordingly, (19), (21) and (23) rewrite, respectively, as follows:
∂µNN(t)
∂t = µNN(t)δ−a+2kN(t)+s [kF (t)F + kN(t) (N − F − 1)]−sFθNi(t) ;
(30)
∂µNj(t)
∂t = µNj(t)δ + skN(t)− sFθNi(t); (31)
∂µNi(t)
∂t = µNi(t)δ + skN(t)− 2θNi(t)− s
£
(F − 1) θNi(t) + (N − 1)φNj(t)
¤
.
(32)
Since I’m looking for the characterization of the steady state equilibrium, I
may use (29) and impose stationarity upon equations (32), to obtain:
µNi(t) = −
2bsδkN (t)
2
¡
1 + bδ2
¢
+ s (F − 1)
. (33)
Then, plugging (29) and (33) into (28), one obtains the following dynamic
equation for the representative leader’s investment (henceforth, I omit the
indication of time for the sake of brevity):
∂IN
∂t ∝ (a− 2bδIN − sFkF )
£
2
¡
1 + bδ2
¢
+ s (F − 1)
¤
+ (34)
+kN
£
s2F −
¡
2
¡
1 + bδ2
¢
+ s (F − 1)
¢
(s (N − F − 1) + 2)
¤
.
which is nil at
I∗N =
(a− sFkF )
£
2
¡
1 + bδ2
¢
+ s (F − 1)
¤
2bδ
£
2
¡
1 + bδ2
¢
+ s (F − 1)
¤ + (35)
+
kN
£
s2F −
¡
2
¡
1 + bδ2
¢
+ s (F − 1)
¢
(s (N − F − 1) + 2)
¤
2bδ
£
2
¡
1 + bδ2
¢
+ s (F − 1)
¤ .
The representative follower’s optimal investment is:
I∗F =
µ∗FF
2b =
a− 2kF − s [kF (F − 1) + kN (N − F )]
2bδ . (36)
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Obviously the sign of I∗N − I∗F depends, amongst other things, upon the
relative number of leaders and followers, for any given {kF , kN}:
I∗N − I∗F ∝ kF (2− s)
£
2
¡
1 + bδ2
¢
+ s (F − 1)
¤
+ (37)
kN
£
s (4− s− 2F (1− s))− 2
¡
2 + bδ2 (2− s)
¢¤
.
Of course the sign of the above expression can be determined on the basis
of the relative size of capacities, the steady state levels of which can be de-
termined imposing stationarity on the kinematic equations of state variables
(2):
kl =
2
¡
1 + bδ2
¢
(a+ 2bδεL)− s [a+ 2bδ (εL + F (εF − εL))]
4
¡
1 + bδ2
¢2
+ 2s
¡
1 + bδ2
¢
(N − 2)− s2 (N + F − 1)
; (38)
kf =
4
¡
1 + bδ2
¢2
(a+ 2bδεF ) + 2s
¡
1 + bδ2
¢
Γ− s2Ψ
8
¡
1 + gδ2
¢3
+ 4s
¡
1 + bδ2
¢2
(N + F − 3) + s2Ω− s3Λ
, (39)
where
Γ ≡ a (F − 2) + 2bδ [εF (N − 2)− εL (N − F )] ;
Ψ ≡ a (2F − 1) + 2bδ [εF (N + F − 1− F (N − F ))− εL (N − F ) (F − 1)]
Ω ≡ 2
¡
1 + bδ2
¢
[3− 2 (N − F ) + F (N − 5)] ; (40)
Λ ≡ (F − 1) (N + F − 1) .
Expressions (38-39) can be used to write the corresponding equilibrium ex-
pressions of
©
I l = δI l + εL, I f = δI f + εF
ª
.
Before assessing the properties of steady state capacities, let me go briefly
back to (37). The sign of this expression is diﬃcult to determine, however
there is a special case where it can be easily done. Assume s = 1, i.e., goods
are homogeneous. If so, then
I∗N − I∗F ∝
¡
1 + 2bδ2 + F
¢
kF −
¡
1 + 2bδ2
¢
kN > 0 (41)
∀F >
¡
1 + 2bδ2
¢
(kN − kF )
kF
≡ bF .
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This allows me to prove the following result:
Lemma 3 Suppose firms supplies perfect substitute goods. In such a case:
• if kN > kF , then I∗N > I∗F for all F > bF ;
• if kN > kF , then I∗N < I∗F for all F ∈
h
1, bF´ ;
• if kN < kF , then I∗N > I∗F for all F ≥ 1.
Proof. The first two claims in the above Lemma can be shown to hold
by quickly observing that, provided kN > kF , then bF > 1 if kN/kF >¡
1 + bδ2
¢
/
¡
1 + 2bδ2
¢
, which is smaller than one for all admissible values
of b and δ. Therefore kN > kF suﬃces to ensure that bF > 1. If instead
kN < kF , then bF < 0. Hence, F > bF holds trivially.
The interesting feature of Lemma 3 lies in the fact that it highlights the
existence of an admissible case where the representative leader is bigger than
the representative follower in terms of installed capacity, but nonetheless the
follower invests more than the leader. This happens if the number of the
followers is low enough, and seems to suggest that decreasing the intensity of
competition among followers (by shrinking their number) ultimately produces
an incentive for them to outperform the leaders as far as the instantaneous
optimal investment eﬀort is concerned.
Assessing the diﬀerence between steady state capital endowments and
investment levels, one finds that the sign of both kl − kf and I l − I f may
change depending upon the relative size of shocks, εF and εL. However, if
εF = εL = ε, we have:
kl − kf ∝ I l − I f ∝ (42)
(a+ 2bδε) /
h
8
¡
1 + bδ2
¢3
+ 4
¡
1 + bδ2
¢2
(N + F − 3) s+
+2
¡
1 + bδ2
¢
(3− 2(N − F ) + F (N − 5)) s2 − (F − 1)(N + F − 1)
¤
,
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where the sign of the numerator depends on the size of the shock ε, while the
sign of the denominator depends on F. In particular, the following holds:
Lemma 4 Suppose εF = εL = ε. In such a case:
• if ε > −a/(2bδ), then kl − kf and I l − I f are (i) positive for all
F ∈
"
1,
£
2
¡
1 + bδ2
¢
− s
¤ £
2
¡
1 + bδ2
¢
+ s (N − 1)
¤
s2
!
;
(ii) negative for all
F >
£
2
¡
1 + bδ2
¢
− s
¤ £
2
¡
1 + bδ2
¢
+ s (N − 1)
¤
s2 .
• if ε < −a/(2bδ), then kl − kf and I l − I f are (i) positive for all
F >
£
2
¡
1 + bδ2
¢
− s
¤ £
2
¡
1 + bδ2
¢
+ s (N − 1)
¤
s2 ;
(ii) negative for all
F ∈
"
1,
£
2
¡
1 + bδ2
¢
− s
¤ £
2
¡
1 + bδ2
¢
+ s (N − 1)
¤
s2
!
.
Proof. The numerator of (42) is positive (resp., negative) for all ε larger
(resp., smaller) than −a/(2bδ). The sign of the denominator changes in cor-
respondence of
F =
s− 2
¡
1 + bδ2
¢
s < 0; (43)
F =
£
2
¡
1 + bδ2
¢
− s
¤ £
2
¡
1 + bδ2
¢
+ s (N − 1)
¤
s2 > 1.
Moreover, the polynomial at the denominator is positive inside the interval
defined by the above roots. This suﬃces to prove the claim.
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Using (35-36) and (38-39) together with (4), one can write the steady
state Stackelberg expected equilibrium profits for a generic pair of leader
and follower, E
¡
πl
¢
and E
¡
πf
¢
, respectively.6
The relative performance of the two representative firms in steady state
is summarized by:
Proposition 5 At the Stackelberg open-loop equilibrium:
(i) for all σ2L ∈ (0, σ2L) , then any leader’s expected profits are larger than
any follower’s;
(ii) if σ2F = σ2L = σ2FL, then any leader’s expected profits are larger than
any follower’s, for all admissible values of F and N ;
(iii) if b → 0, then any leader’s expected profits are larger than any fol-
lower’s, for all admissible values of σ2F , σ2L, σ2FL, F and N.
Proof. Claim (i) of the Proposition requires simple albeit tedious algebra,
the resulting threshold level σ2L being a cumbersome expression containing all
the relevant parameters of the model. However, σ2Lcan be explicitly written
in the duopoly case with F = 1 and N = 2,7 where E
¡
πl
¢
> E
¡
πf
¢
iﬀ
σ2L <
©
a2
¡
1 + 4bδ2
¢
+ 16g2δ2σ2FL+ (44)
+4b
£
4 + bδ2
¡
29 + 4bδ2
¡
18 + bδ2
¡
15 + 4bδ2
¢¢¢¤
σ2F
ª
/'
where
' ≡ 16b
¡
1 + bδ2
¢ ¡
1 + bδ2
¡
1 + bδ2
¢ ¡
7 + 4bδ2
¢¢
. (45)
As to claim (ii), observe that if σ2F = σ2L = σ2FL, then
E
¡
πL1
¢
−E
¡
πF2
¢
∝
£
2
¡
1 + bδ2
¢
− s
¤2
+ sF
¡
1 + bδ2 − s
¢
(46)
6These expressions are omitted for brevity.
7See Proposition 10 in Lambertini (2005, p. 455).
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which is always positive.
To prove claim (iii), it suﬃces to observe that
lim
b→0
£
E
¡
πl
¢
−E
¡
πf
¢¤
= (4 + sF ) (1− s) + s2 > 0. (47)
This concludes the proof.
Claim (i) in the above Proposition simply states the intuitive result that,
if the degree of uncertainty borne by the representative leader is high enough,
then, all else equal, following may be preferable to leading in terms of ex-
pected profits. Claim (ii) illustrates the special case in which all firms face
the same shock. If so, then all that matters is having the first mover advan-
tage at any point in time. Finally, claim (iii) deals with the limit case where
investment costs are negligible. In this circumstance the leader is better oﬀ
irrespective of the values of all other relevant parameters, the intuitive reason
being that under this condition the role of uncertainty becomes immaterial.
The stability analysis of the Stackelberg open-loop game is rather cum-
bersome, yet it can be carried out (without resorting to numerical calcu-
lations) to verify that the steady state open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium¡
kf, kl, I f, I l
¢
is a saddle point.8
I am now in a position to make a crucial remark concerning the growth
rates exhibited by leaders and followers, respectively. Evaluating the sign of
·
kL−
·
kF is a diﬃcult task even in special cases. However, as a quick inspection
of the proof of Lemma 2 reveals, growth rates surely diﬀer because, in general,
·
IL and
·
IF diﬀer at all t ∈ [0,∞) . In addition to this, firms’ saddle paths to
the steady state are independent of initial conditions k0; hence, there follows
that growth rates are determined by the distribution of roles across firms in
the games (i.e., the timing of moves) but not their initial respective sizes (or
8The detailed stability properties of the Jacobian matrix are fully illustrated in Lam-
bertini (2005, Proposition 11, p. 455) for the duopoly case.
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installed capacities), and the cases in which kL (0) > kF (0) while kl < kf,
or kL (0) < kF (0) while kl > kf, are both admissible. This brief discussion
ultimately entails that the present setup does not yield theoretical support
to Gibrat’s law.
4 Comparative statics
First, I evaluate firms’ profits under perfect certainty, i.e., at σ1 = σ2 =
σ12 = 0 :
πl =
a2
£
2
¡
1 + bδ2
¢
+ s
¤2 £¡
1 + bδ2
¢ ¡
2
¡
1 + bδ2
¢
+ s (F − 1)
¢
− s2F
¤¡
2
¡
1 + bδ2
¢
+ s (F − 1)
¢ £
2
¡
1 + bδ2
¢ ¡
s (N − 2) + 2
¡
1 + bδ2
¢¢
− s2 (N + F − 1)
¤2 ;
(48)
πf = a2
¡
1 + bδ2
¢ £
2
¡
1 + bδ2
¢ ¡
s (F − 2) + 2
¡
1 + bδ2
¢¢
− s2 (2F − 1)
¤2 /£
2
¡
1 + bδ2
¢ ¡¡
3− 2 (N − F ) + F (N − 5) s2
¢
+ (49)
+2
¡
1 + bδ2
¢ ¡
s (N + F − 3) + 2
¡
1 + bδ2
¢¢¢
− (F − 1) (N + F − 1) s2
¤2 ,
with
πl − πf ∝ s2 +
£
4
¡
1 + bδ2
¢
+ sF
¤ ¡
1 + bδ2 − s
¢
> 0 (50)
for all admissible values of parameters. The deterministic case yields the
well known profit ranking usually associated with games in which controls are
strategic substitutes (i.e., best replies are downward sloping), as is well known
from previous literature (Dowrick, 1986; and Hamilton and Slutsky, 1990,
inter alia). However, the ranking of firms’ profits may drastically change due
to uncertainty. For the sake of simplicity, relabel σ2L = ζL, σ2F = ζF and
σ2FL = ζFL. The following properties can be ascertained:
∂E
¡
πl
¢
∂ζL
< 0;
∂E
¡
πl
¢
∂ζF
> 0;
∂E
¡
πl
¢
∂ζFL
< 0∀b, s, δ,N, F ; (51)
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∂E
¡
πf
¢
∂ζL
> 0;
∂E
¡
πf
¢
∂ζF
< 0;
∂E
¡
πf
¢
∂ζFL
< 0∀b, s, δ,N, F. (52)
Moreover:¯¯¯¯
¯∂E
¡
πl
¢
∂ζL
¯¯¯¯
¯ > ∂E
¡
πf
¢
∂ζL
;
¯¯¯¯
¯∂E
¡
πf
¢
∂ζF
¯¯¯¯
¯ > ∂E
¡
πl
¢
∂ζF
∀b, s, δ,N, F. (53)
The above list of partial derivatives reveals a few facts:
• increasing the variance of the shock aﬀecting the leaders (resp., fol-
lower) generates a positive spillover for the followers (leaders), while
obviously damaging the leaders (followers) themselves;
• moreover, the former eﬀect is smaller than the latter in absolute value;
• increasing the correlation between shocks negatively aﬀects the perfor-
mance of both leaders and followers alike.9
5 Concluding remarks
I have described a stochastic diﬀerential game in which firms invest to in-
crease productive capacity, following time-consistent open-loop Stackelberg
strategies. The equilibrium of the model highlights diﬀerent growth rates
along the saddle path. Accordingly, the analysis carried out in this paper is
clearly in contrast with Gibrat’s law. Moreover, it appears that there are ad-
missible cases where the followers’s growth rates are larger than the leaders’,
e.g. when the representative leader is indeed bigger than the representative
follower in terms of installed capacity. This may ultimately lead to situations
where equilibrium profits are larger for followers than for leaders.
9It is worth noting that this result has interesting macroeconomic implications, sug-
gesting that integration or globalization may favour the diﬀusion of shocks across mar-
kets/countries, so that firms located in markets previously separated by significantly high
trade barriers are no longer protected from shocks taking place abroad.
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